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INTRODUCTION

Jonathan Remy Nash's article, On the Efficient Deployment of
Rules and Standards to Define Federal Jurisdiction, bravely tacklesand creatively merges-the dual debates over rules versus standards
and the ideal contours of federal jurisdiction. 1 He proposes a revised
regime in which rules define jurisdictional boundaries at the front
end, while standards "migrate" into a discretionary abstention phase
at the back end. 2 This realignment, Nash argues, optimizes efficiency
and predictability by placing a bright-line rule at the jurisdictional
threshold, while promoting federalism by establishing a safety net

1.

2.

Associate Professor of Law, William & Mary Law School.
Faculty Fellow, Thomas Jefferson School of Law.
65 VAND. L. REV. 509 (2012).
Id. at 518.
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that applies standards to claims that cross the threshold. 3 In this way,
Nash hopes to have his "jurisdictional cake and eat it, toO."4
Importantly, Nash does not purport to alter the substance of
jurisdictional requirements; rather, he seeks primarily to reorder
them and to recharacterize them as either mandatory or discretionary.
For federal question jurisdiction, for example, Nash accepts the
requirements of existing doctrine: that the well-pleaded complaint
must show a substantial federal issue that is central to the claim. 5
Nash's primary contribution is to reorganize these features of federal
question jurisdiction into front-end, mandatory rules (like the wellpleaded complaint rule) and back-end, discretionary abstention (like
parts of Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering &
Manufacturing 6) .
The pursuit of a happy rules/standards coupling is a worthy
endeavor. Nash's creative proposal for coexistence, rather than
choosing sides, is profitable not only in its mixing of rules and
standards, but also in that it begins to match form to function on a
more precise scale by segregating rules and standards into grants and
discretionary abstentions. Segregation has the added benefits of
making judges apply jurisdictional doctrine more consciously and of
improving transparency to litigants and the legal community.
In its details, however, Nash's proposal for reshaping federal
question jurisdiction suffers from underdeveloped premises and
unanticipated potential effects. On the premises, Nash's proposal both
uses ambiguous definitions of "rules" and "standards" and assumes
that clear and simple "rules" are actually attainable in jurisdictional
doctrine. Regarding unanticipated potential effects, the proposal
would only work with a broad boundary rule, which would erode
efficiency and predictability. In addition, Nash's proposal to migrate
standards to a discretionary abstention stage would generate its own
costs at both the district and appellate levels.
We conclude that Nash's innovative proposal is most valuable
as a reclassification of existing federal question doctrine into a more
transparent blend of mandates and discretion. We applaud this
improved transparency and urge others to read Nash's proposal in this
light.

3.
4.
5.

6.

Id. at 550-56.
Id. at 518.
Id. at 550-51.
545 U.S. 308 (2005).
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1. DEFINITIONAL AMBIGUITIES
Because the consequences of Nash's "migration" proposal
depend heavily on proper classification of jurisdictional components as
"rules" or "standards," the baseline definition of each term acquires
additional importance. Nash's proposal would benefit from more stable
definitions.
Nash's definition of "rule" begins with Kathleen Sullivan's
famous formulation: a rule compels the decisionmaker to respond in a
certain way based on delimited triggering facts. 7 Under this definition,
a rule is mandatory and determinate. However, Nash suggests that
not all mandatory directives should necessarily be treated as rules.
Rather, he believes a mandatory directive should be treated as a
standard when it uses a sufficiently "amorphous test for when th[e]
result is mandated."8 Accordingly, Nash seeks to "limit application of
the moniker 'rule' to settings where the legal test is absolutely clear
and devoid of any controversy." 9 This shift results in a new
formulation, one that depends less upon a mandatory/discretionary
distinction and more upon the related but independent value of
clarity. 10 Later, Nash shifts definitions again, suggesting that a rule is
"mandatory and clear in terms of when it applie[s] and when it d[oes]
not" 11 and has an "easy" and "predictable" application. 12 Rules, he
poses, are more effective at "constrain[ing] government" actions "[b]y
virtue of their clarity and 'all-or-nothing' application .... " 13
Combining these descriptions, Nash's conception of a rule embodies
uncontroversial tests that are absolutely clear, simple, and
predictable, with an all-or-nothing application.
We suspect that few "rules" will satisfy this definition, and that
those that do will provide little utility. Nash does not elaborate on
what an "absolutely clear" test "devoid of any controversy" is. How is
"absolutely clear" different from merely "clear"? Is clarity judged by
the design of the rule or by its interpretation? Does the controversy
pertain to the meaning, the application, or both?
7.
Nash, supra note 1, at 520-21.
8.
Id. at 528. Confusingly, in his evaluative section, Nash says that standard-based
decisions under his proposal would be subject to an abuse of discretion standard on appeal. Id. at
530.
9.
Id. at 521.
10. See Scott Dodson, The Complexity of Jurisdictional Clarity, 97 VA. L. REV. 1, 15-23
(2011). By way of a quick example, the tax code is a rule-based scheme that is anything but clear,
while the "reasonable man" standard can be clear in a wide swath of applications.
11. Nash, supra note 1, at 532 n.101.
12. Id. at 538.
13. Id. at 523.
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Even the tests Nash expressly identifies as "rules" cannot
satisfy his compound definition. For example, Nash states that tests
for diversity jurisdiction, supplemental jurisdiction, and CAFA
jurisdiction are "rule-like," 14 but that assertion seems quite wrong
under his definition of a rule. The amount-in-controversy requirement
of statutory diversity jurisdiction can be extremely difficult to apply,
and even the Supreme Court has admitted that the test for corporate
citizenship will prove unpredictable in some cases. 15 It is hard to
classify § 1367(a)'s so related" requirement for supplemental
jurisdiction as a rule under Nash's definition, and it appears that
§ 1367(c)(4) would fall under Nash's definition of a standard. 16 CAFA
explicitly gives district courts standard-like discretion to exercise
jurisdiction over certain classes based on the percentages of homestate class members.17 Even Nash's poster child for rules, the wellpleaded complaint rule, is neither "absolutely clear" nor completely
"devoid of any controversy."18 Despite all of Nash's attempts, we are
still unsure what qualifies as a "rule" under his definition. 19
Likewise, Nash begins his definition of "standard" with
Sullivan's formulation: a standard employs the totality of facts and
underlying policy to influence a decision. 2o Nash then proceeds to
characterize standards as "flexible" and "readily adaptable" but
difficult to apply and unpredictable. 21 This elaboration is fair enough
(though we are suspicious of the generality that standards are always
difficult to apply and unpredictable). Nash later concludes that even a
jurisdictional directive can be a standard if "a court applying it must
consider policies and facts, proceed on a case-by-case basis, and
ultimately employ substantial discretion. Otherwise, it is properly
categorized as a rule."22
We think we understand the importance of flexibility, policies,
and discretion, but we question the comprehensibility of Nash's
14. Id. at 511-12.
15. Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181, 1193 (2010).
16. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1367(a), (c)(4) (2006). Section 1367(c)(4) allows district courts to
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction "in exceptional circumstances, [for] other compelling
reasons
17. Id. § 1332(d).
18. See, e.g., Dodson, supra note 10, at 36.
19. Daniel Meltzer, for example, argues that Younger abstention has "relatively
determinate boundaries," suggesting that determinacy is not the exclusive feature of a rule and
not always missing from abstentions. Daniel J. Meltzer, Jurisdiction and Discretion Revisited, 79
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1891, 1907 (2004).
20. Nash, supra note 1, at 521.
21. Id. at 522.
22. Id. at 528.
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definition as a whole. Don't most rules require the application of facts?
Don't many also proceed on a case-by-case basis? And what kind and
how much discretion is "substantial" discretion? Nash's definition
appears to conflate the traditional definition of a "standard" with
related but independent ideas of discretion, complexity, and
murkiness. 23 As a result, Nash imports confusion that obscures the
contours of his new structure. 24 In reality, the actual boundaries
between rules and standards are gray. Nash's definitions
underestimate the inherent complexity in the classification of any
analytical process as "rule" versus "standard."
All this is to say that Nash need not engage the dichotomy of
rules and standards to make his point. In a sense, his proposal could
be clearer if it were more "standard-like," separating "clear and
determinate" jurisdictional boundaries from "discretionary and policyladen" abstention doctrines. We proceed on the basis of that principle
in the sections below.

II. BROADENING BOUNDARIES, ERASING GAINS
Nash seeks to procedurally reorder, but not substantively alter,
jurisdictional requirements by pulling mandatory and clear
requirements to the front end of the determination and pushing
discretionary and standard-based requirements to the back end.
Critically, converting standards into abstentions creates a one-way
ratchet used only to narrow jurisdiction, not to broaden it. This, in
turn, requires that the boundary rule be set broadly to "sweep within
federal jurisdiction all cases that could have come within federal
jurisdiction under the standard." 25
This broadening of the scope of the jurisdictional boundary has
significant implications for federal question jurisdiction. As Nash
concedes, broadening the federal-question-jurisdiction boundary to
account for standard-based abstention would need to encompass even
cases "where the federal issue merely lurks in the background."26
23. See Dodson, supra note 10, at 15-20 (arguing that standards-which traditionally
encompass holistic consideration of the facts-may achieve both clarity and simplicity in specific
circumstances).
24. See, e.g., Nash, supra note 1, at 510-11 (discussing the "connection with maritime
activity" test); id. at 513 (discussing the lack of clarity in discretionary abstention doctrines); id.
at 516 (discussing how federal jurisdictional standards allow a federal court to "cherry pick" the
cases it wishes to hear); id. at 517 n.26 (discussing the well-pleaded complaint rule); id. at 518
(discussing discretionary abstention); id. at 532-33 (discussing the inefficiency of "[mJurky,
standard-based boundaries" to jurisdiction).
25. Id. at 550.
26. Id. at 550-51.
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Resetting the jurisdictional boundary as this broad rule means the
presence of any embedded federal issue in the plaintiffs well-pleaded
complaint would give federal district courts jurisdiction to hear the
case, though they would later have discretion to decline to hear a
claim in which the federal issue fails the Grable test. 27
Such a broad rule at the initial boundary is likely to swell
federal dockets by bestowing jurisdiction on cases with only a
tangential federal ingredient. 28 It is not apparent that the threat of
dismissal or remand via discretionary abstention (and deferential
appellate review) would deter litigants from filing or removing in
greater numbers those cases whose federal jurisdiction is doubtful
under Nash's abstention phase. 29 Even if abstentions rein in this
expansive jurisdiction and eventually produce the same allocation of
cases as under the current regime,30 that result would be achieved
only after the federal courts assumed jurisdiction under broader
mandatory rules. 31 For these reasons, we doubt that Nash's view
reflects a more efficient ordering of the federal-question test.
Further, broadening the boundary rule necessitates broadening
the exceptions to maintain a constant scope. In other words, instead of
the current state of the law, which encompasses a limited grant with
few exceptions, Nash proposes a broad grant with many exceptions.
Those exceptions, which take the form of Nash's discretionary
abstentions, chip away at the value of having a rule-based boundary
in the first place. Under Nash's proposal, we expect very little
litigation regarding the boundary rule because its breadth would
sweep up all of the close cases. Instead, federal question litigation
would focus on the discretionary factors, which would have to do the
work to properly allocate cases. The resulting primacy of these

27.
text.

Id. at 551. For discussion of the Grable test, see infra notes 57-61 and accompanying

28.
See Osborn v. Bank of U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 823 (1824) (holding that Congress
may confer federal question jurisdiction over cases with an "ingredient" of federal law). Compare
Nash, supra note 1, at 541 fig.lB (representing the "no jurisdiction" class of claims under a
standard-based jurisdictional boundary at roughly the halfway mark), with id. at 544 figA
(drawing the "no jurisdiction" boundary line above the halfway mark for the rule-based boundary
with discretionary abstention).
29. This is especially true for removed cases, where defendants' increased win rate in
federal court alters the cost-benefit analysis in favor of removal despite the threat of remand. See
Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really Reveal Anything About the
Legal System? Win Rates and Removal Jurisdiction, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 581, 593-95 (1998)
(demonstrating that plaintiff win rates are lower in removed cases).
30. See Nash, supra note 1, at 555.
31. See id. at 550-51.
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standards would likely erode many of the supposed efficiency and
predictability gains from Nash's new regime. 32
These two changes in breadth are likely to cause new friction
with state courts. Nash appears to argue that his proposal will reduce
friction by allowing federal courts to "cherry pick" only those cases
that truly require federal jurisdiction, 33 but we think he gets it exactly
backward. A broad initial boundary creates a larger pool of cases
allocated to the federal courts, even if state issues predominate. On
the back end, because Nash's abstention is a one-way ratchet, federal
courts will only "cherry pick" cases for dismissal or remand, not for
assumption of jurisdiction (and even then, only if the parties have not
already waived the issue). Nash's proposal thus strikes us as
empowermg federal courts to usurp jurisdiction rather than
constraining them.

III. ADDITIONAL COSTS AT THE DISTRICT AND ApPELLATE LEVELS
It is not clear to us how shifting or "migrating" jurisdictional
standards into a discretionary phase solves the problem of murkiness
or enhances overall predictability at the district-court level. Nash
states that "[a]lthough discretionary abstention obscures a bit of the
predictability of the rule, outcomes still are likely to be fairly
predictable overall." 34 But this aggregate predictability is not
inevitable or necessarily likely. Whether standards are incorporated
on the front end or the back end, they still create the same level of
uncertainty in the ultimate result, recalling David Shapiro's and
Daniel Meltzer's admonitions that "where" matters less than
"whether." 35
In fact, by moving standards into a separate phase at the back
end of the determination, Nash's proposal generates at least three
additional uncertainty costs at the district-court level. First, the
proposal delays the ultimate jurisdictional decision. If the case has
moved forward from the initial acceptance of jurisdiction under the
broad rule until the time of discretionary abstention, the costs of a

32. Id. at 522 n.40; see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 TermForeword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 63 (1992)
(,,[DJecisionmaking economies from the application of rules, however, will be offset if
decisionmakers spend time inventing end-runs around them because they just cannot stand their
over- or under-inclusiveness.").
33. Nash, supra note 1, at 554.
34. Id. at 539.
35. David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 561-62 (1985);
Meltzer, supra note 19, at 1907-15.
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finding oflack of jurisdiction may be exacerbated. 36 Second, by making
the abstention component discretionary, Nash adds a layer of
uncertainty, as litigants must try to predict not only how the court
will exercise its discretion, but also whether it will. 37 And third, Nash's
proposal to change jurisdictional components into discretionary
abstention doctrines creates frictional costs with existing removal
doctrine, which recognizes a presumption against removal in cases of
doubtful jurisdiction. 38 If the rules are broadened on the front end of
the inquiry to allow more cases to cross the jurisdictional threshold,
the additional costs of waiting for the other shoe to drop on the back
end in the form of less predictable and discretionary standards strike
us as particularly significant.
Nash's proposal to make discretionary abstention waivable
may help offset these additional costS. 39 But jurisdiction protects
systemic values-including docket allocation and federalism-that
many deem too important to leave to the whims of the parties or to the
efficiencies of a particular case. 40 Nash briefly addresses this concern
by suggesting that abstention could be ordered sua sponte by the court
or even reasserted by the parties after waiver,41 but these suggestions
then undermine his proposal to use waiver as a cost-saving feature.
At the appellate level, Nash would change the standard of
review for standard-based jurisdictional decisions from de novo to
abuse of discretion. 42 He would also permit review of some previously
unreviewable jurisdictional remands. 43 These proposals would have
profound consequences for both original and removed cases. We agree
with Nash that his new regime's abuse of discretion standard for
abstention dismissals likely would reduce appellate costs for litigants
and courts in original federal cases. 44 However, his proposal will
36. See 14C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, EDWARD H. COOPER & JOAN E.
STEINMAN, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3731, at 482-85 (4th ed. 2009) ("The goal is
early resolution of the court system in which the case will be heard.").
37. Nash briefly deals with this overlay, dismissing it with the notion that appellate courts
could direct district courts to "feel free" to exercise their discretion. Nash, supra note 1, at 555.
The "feel free" instruction does not eliminate the preliminary inquiry into whether discretion is
warranted.
38.
See, e.g., In re Hot-Hed Inc., 477 F.3d 320,324 (5th Cir. 2007) ("[A]ny doubt about the
propriety of removal must be resolved in favor of remand .... ").
39.
See Nash, supra note 1, at 538 tbL 1.
40. In general, we are sympathetic to the idea that certain components of jurisdiction could
be waivable. See Scott Dodson, Hybridizing Jurisdiction, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1439, 1480-82 (2011).
But any concrete proposal must grapple earnestly with the countervailing costs.
41. Nash, supra note 1, at 555-56.
42. Id. at 552-53.
43. Id. at 552 n.160.
44. Id. at 552-53.
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increase the number of potential appeals in removed cases by
circumventing 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d)'s prohibition of appellate review.
Currently, remand based on any part of a jurisdictional test, including
standard-based components, is not reviewable. 45 Nash's proposal, to
the extent it makes abstentions nonjurisdictional, would turn some
standard-based remands, currently unreviewable as "jurisdictionaf'
determinations, into reviewable decisions. 46 And, even in original
cases, a reduction in appellate costs might translate to greater costs at
the district-court level. If, as Nash proposes, the primary litigation
points will be the discretionary and murky abstention components,
and if district-court decisions on those points will be reviewable only
under the deferential abuse of discretion standard, then district courts
and their litigants will lose the clarity-enhancing function of de novo
appellate review. 47
IV.

SOME BENEFITS OF TRANSPARENCY

Nash's proposal for rule-based boundaries and standard-based
abstentions may be most fitting and useful as a proposal for
transparency-not for transformation. In many ways, his regime
reflects current doctrine, with modest reclassifications. The current
rules for federal question jurisdiction already proceed from a rule-like
phase through a standard-like phase. The jurisdictional tests for
federal claims, as well as for federal issues in state claims, already
articulate the inquiry as a two-step process that first considers rules
to be satisfied and then considers standards that can be applied to
deny jurisdiction despite satisfaction of the rules.

45. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)-(d) (2006) (providing that a federal-court remand to state court
because "it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction" is not appealable);
Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 343 (1976) ("If a trial judge purports to
remand a case on the ground that it was removed improvidently and without jurisdiction, his
order is not subject to challenge in the court of appeals by appeal, by mandamus, or otherwise."
(internal quotation marks omitted»; cf New Orleans & Gulf Coast Ry. Co. v. Barrois, 533 F. 3d
321, 326-28, 338 (5th Cir. 2008) (refusing, under § 1447(d), to hear an appeal of a case remanded
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, while reviewing de novo the jurisdictional dismissal of a
consolidated original case).
46. See Thermtron, 423 U.S. at 344 (holding that abstention based on nonjurisdictional
factors is reviewable despite § 1447(d»; see also Andrew D. Bradt, Grable on the Ground:
Mitigating Unchecked Jurisdictional Discretion, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1153, 1194-1207 (2011)
(arguing that Grable's balancing factor should be treated as an abstention to enable appellate
review); James E. Pfander, Collateral Review of Remand Orders: Reasserting the Supervisory
Role of the Supreme Court, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 493 (2011).
47. See Elizabeth Y. McCuskey, Clarity and Clarification: Grable Federal Questions in the
Eyes of Their Beholders, 91 NEB. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (suggesting directive influence of
appellate opinions on embedded-federal-question jurisdiction).
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For example, even Holmes Rule 48 cases, in which federal law
provides the basis for the claim, initially must cross the jurisdictional
threshold established by the well-pleaded complaint rule. If the
federal claim arises only as a defense or counterclaim, then there is no
jurisdiction and the case cannot cross the threshold into federal
jurisdiction. 49 Nash recognizes the well-pleaded complaint rule as a
bright-line rule. 5o After crossing the rule threshold, courts must then
reject those claims "otherwise within their jurisdiction" if those claims
fail to meet the standard of claim "substantiality."51 The Court has, at
points, described claim substantiality in terms that resemble
abstention, explaining that "claims otherwise within [federal court]
jurisdiction" lose their jurisdictional status "if they are 'so attenuated
and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit' .... "52
Nash further proposes making jurisdiction over state-law
claims raising federal issues, as in Grable,53 entirely a matter of
discretionary abstention. 54 Initially, Nash subsumes the whole Grable
inquiry under the category of "centrality."55 But, unlike the singular
well-pleaded complaint and federal-claim substantiality "rules,"
Grable's federal-issue test itself includes both rules and standards in a
"multifactor" test. 56 Stated in the conjunctive, a state-law claim
implicating a federal question must satisfy each of Grable's four
factors,
which
follow
a
rules-then-standards
progression,
microcosmically tracking Nash's proposed structure for front-end rules
and back-end standards. 57

48. See Nash, supra note 1, at 547 (identifying Justice Holmes's suggestion that "[a] suit
arises under the law that creates the cause of action" as "clearly a rule"); see also Am. Well
Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916) (stating the rule).
49. Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 112-13 (1936).
50. Nash, supra note 1, at 545-46.
51. Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-37 (1974) (emphasis added).
52. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Newburyport Water Co. v. Newburyport, 193 U.S. 561,
579 (1904».
53. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308 (2005).
54. Nash, supra note 1, at 549-50 (classifying the whole Grable test as a "centrality"
inquiry and advocating that "[i]t would be desirable to migrate" both "centrality" and
"substantiality" to abstentions).
55. See id. at 545-49 (breaking "arising under" jurisdiction into three components-the
well-pleaded complaint rule, the substantiality of the federal claim, and the centrality of the
federal issue-and discussing Grable under "centrality").
56. See id. at 549 n.151 (explaining that Grable "introduced a multifactor balancing test"
for centrality).
57. See Grable, 545 U.S. at 314 (stating the test for jurisdiction over federal issues
embedded in state-law claims as whether "a state-law claim necessarily raisers] a stated federal
issue, actually disputed and substantial, which a federal forum may entertain without disturbing
any congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities").
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Grable federal questions must first pass (1) the well-pleaded
complaint rule and (2) the relatively determinate "necessary" and
"actually disputed" rules before progressing to (3) the federal-issue
"substantiality" standard to determine whether jurisdiction exists. 58
After determining the federal issue's qualifications for federal
jurisdiction, a court must assess (4) whether exercising its jurisdiction
will disturb "any congressionally approved balance of federal and state
judicial responsibilities." 59 More descriptively, this federalism factor
asks courts to apply standards to determine whether there exists any
"good reason to shirk from federal jurisdiction" established by the
preceding factors.6o Although Grable's federalism factor is not
explicitly phrased as an abstention phase, other commentators have
convincingly argued that it effectively functions as an abstention
phase by guiding district courts to remand cases that satisfy
jurisdictional requirements if exercising jurisdiction would invite a
flood of other federal filings.61
Therefore, Nash's proposed structure to a great extent
describes the current jurisdictional analyses in more honest termsrecognizing that federal- and state-law claims crossing the wellpleaded complaint threshold are "within [district courts'] jurisdiction"
unless the court deems "otherwise" based on various standards.
In Nash's Figure 4, the standard-based inquiry creates
fuzziness at the threshold between jurisdiction and no jurisdiction. 62
However, the mandatory threshold remains determinate, while the
fuzzy standard-based inquiry becomes an abstention phase. Because
Nash proposes an initial determination of mandatory jurisdiction
based on a rule, followed by a back-end abstention from exercising
that jurisdiction based on standards, his Figure 4 might more
appropriately show the refrain from exercising jurisdiction as a
diminution of the bottom half of the potential jurisdiction area, rather
than a muddling of the jurisdictional threshold itself.
The figure below illustrates Nash's proposed process and the
distinction he implicitly draws between a threshold jurisdictional

58. See id. Note that the "substantiality" test for federal issues under Grable is separate
and distinct from the "substantiality" test for federal claims. Compare id. at 313 (using "serious
federal interest" as the touchstone for issue substantiality), with Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528,
536-37 (1974) (quoting Newburyport Water Co. v. Newburyport, 193 U.S. 561, 579 (1904»
(defining claim substantiality by contrast to claims that are "absolutely devoid of merit"), and
Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 289 U.S. 103, 105 (1933) ("obviously without merit").
59. Grable, 545 U.S. at 314.
60. Id. at 319-20 (emphasis added).
61. Bradt, supra note 46, at 1194-1207.
62. Nash, supra note 1, at 544 fig.4.
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determination based on the well-pleaded complaint rule and
abstention based on the substantiality and centrality standards.
Under Nash's description of a "rule-based jurisdictional boundary,"
the determinate rule "has effect along the clear demarcation" between
black and white zones because a rule and "no abstention" defines the
boundary.63 Similarly, his proposal for revising jurisdiction places the
well-pleaded complaint rule at the "rule-based jurisdictional
boundary" and therefore should represent that boundary with
juxtaposed black and white zones. 64 Further, the discretionary
abstention Nash proposes is depicted more aptly as reverse shading at
the bottom, because he proposes to "migrate these standards away
from the jurisdictional boundary to discretionary abstentions, leaving
a reconstructed rule-based boundary."65 Thus, Nash's regIme
maintains a black-and-white, predictable threshold rule for
jurisdiction and introduces graying standards in an abstention phase
that does not alter or muddy the threshold determination. 66
Well-Pleaded
Complaint Rule

No Jurisdiction

......

Substantiality
and Centrality
Standards

Nash's proposal to reclassify discretionary standards as
abstentions thus descriptively fits existing jurisdictional analyses by
tracking their rules-then-standards progression and provides a more
transparent way to depict the district courts' discretion in applying
substantiality, centrality, and federalism standards. Viewing Nash's
proposal as one that simply gives transparency to the existing uses of

63. Id. at 540 & fig.IA.
64. See id. at 545-46 (characterizing the well-pleaded complaint rule as a bright-line rule).
65. Id. at 550 (emphasis added).
66. See id. at 542-43 & fig.3 (depicting Pullman abstention as reverse shading at the
bottom of the figure because its test is "the opposite" of the substantiality standard).

2012]

JURISDICTIONAL RULES AND STANDARDS

43

discretion to determine jurisdiction could potentially be less
destabilizing than altering the jurisdictional determinations
themselves. 67 Perhaps most laudably, the added transparency that
comes from labeling standards as a discretionary exercise may
contribute to federal-court legitimacy. 68 That is, candidly
acknowledging the role of discretion in jurisdictional determinations
may advance doctrinal development and enhance the legitimacy of
those courts developing it.
CONCLUSION

Although the problems we have outlined here undermine
Nash's laudable attempt to achieve efficiency, predictability, accuracy,
legitimacy, and harmony, Nash's proposal makes significant advances
in how we think about and discuss rules and standards in the context
of federal question jurisdiction. In particular, his proposal for rulebased boundaries and discretionary abstentions encourages a
meaningful coexistence of rules and standards, with form following
function. Additionally, his proposal encourages conscious choice and
thoughtful design by those crafting statutes, abstentions, and
interpretations of federal-question-jurisdiction doctrine. 69
On the whole, the transparency about the nature of
jurisdictional inquiries inherent in Nash's proposed taxonomy of
jurisdictional rules and standards may offer the most reliable
improvement to the jurisdictional regime. It may enhance the
legitimacy of district-court decisions and clarify jurisdictional doctrine.
Nash's proposed "efficient deployment" thus brings needed nuance and
compromise to the rules-versus-standards debate.

67. Cf Martin H. Redish, The Federal Courts, Judicial Restraint, and the Importance of
Analyzing Legal Doctrine, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1378, 1399 (1985) (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER,
THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM (1985» (arguing that, "at least in the context of
abstention, an increase in judicial restraint ... would probably result in a significant increase in
the size offederal dockets").
68. Regarding legitimacy, however, it is both difficult to determine whether litigants really
care about jurisdictional decisions and difficult to assess whether Nash's proposal would enhance
any such perceptions of legitimacy.
69. See Nash, supra note 1, at 525-26.

